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THE MESSY WORLD WE INHABIT 
ON AUGUST 1, 2007, the entire truss structure of the I -35W Bridge over 
the Mississippi River at Minneapolis, Minnesota, collapsed during the 
morning rush hour. 1 The horrifying catastrophe was over in just seconds. 
In the end, the disaster claimed the lives of thirteen motorists and injured 
145 others. A series oflawsuits followed until finally, two years later, on 
August 23,2010, the last lawsuit was settled, to the tune of$52.4 million. 
Subsequent to this spectacular engineering failure, no one was sur-
prised that lawsuits were filed, and won or lost. Yet we wished it were not 
always so. Both engineering designs on the one hand, and their design 
contexts on the other hand, can be "bad" without there being a question 
of assigning blame. Granted, sometimes failure can be blan1ed on human 
error. And we readily admit that once the finger has been pointed and the 
offending culprit penalized, people tend to feel just a little bit better about 
the disaster, as though the weight has been lifted just a little. But can blame 
always be assigned? And if not, why do we assume that it can? 
The habit of seeking someone to blame for engineering failures 
springs from a deep-seated temptation to view the world through an 
ideal lens. This temptation infects engineer and non-engineer alike. Yet 
for students of engineering, the temptation to think in an ideal mode can 
be made more acute by their exposure to certain aspects of the first- and 
second-year engineering curriculum. We will call these features, and the 
outlook produced, "ideal-world thinking:' Eventually, the very best engi-
neering students unlearn ideal-world thinking, or at least learn to temper 
it with strong doses of skeptical realism. But in the meantime, ideal-world 
thinking hinders excellence in engineering and misleads ethical conversa-
tion. So, before we can get a handle on engineering ethics, we must begin 
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by comparing the ideal world to the "messy world;' which is to say, the 
world in which we actually live. 
THE 1DEAL WoRLD 
Take a good look at Figure 1.1. Gear A rotates at a speed of 3.6n rad/sec. 
. . . h Wh will p be one At time t
0
, a point (P) 1s at the pos1t10n as s own. ere 
minute later, at t60? 
Gear B, 13 teeth 
Gear A, 53 teeth 
FIGURE 1.1 Calculating e for P 602 
For most readers, the calculation is very straightforward. The ratio 
between the gears is 53:13. Sixty revolutions of Gear A will correspond to 
(60 x 53)/13 revolutions of Gear B. Since whole revolutions can be dis-
counted (all were after is the position of P relative to the x-axis), 3180/13 
will produce the same e value for P 60 as 8/ 13 rotation. This rotation must be 
subtracted from eo. We can tell from the diagram that p 0 is I I 13 of a turn 
in the counterclockwise direction (2n/13 rad or 360/13°). So, if this were 
an exam, we could safely predict the final position of P 
60 
to be (2n/13) 
- (8(2n)/13) = -7(2n)/13 rad or 6(2n)/13 rad, if we measure e in the con-
ventional counterclockwise direction (approx 166°). 
But hold on a minute. Haven't we shifted into calculation mode a 
bit too quickly? Where did this problem come from? Are we so familiar 
with textbooks that in rushing to fi.nd the answer, we may forget that an 
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engineering problem has a specific context in the real world where things 
can bind, bend, break off, melt, and so on?3 The diagram looks official 
enough as the above magnification (Figure 1.1 b) shows. In fact, it was 
generated by a program that takes almost no account of the physical limits 
of actual gear trains as well as the conventions of manufacturing. For ex-
ample, it is standard to design gears with non-prime numbers of teeth. A 
gear train with prime numbered teeth can be built, but these are not stock 
and therefore would have to be special ordered. So why are the numbers 
of teeth in this particular diagram prime numbers (13, 53)? Is there a very 
peculiar and particular application behind this problem? (There is, actu-
ally. More on that later in the chapter.) 
In addition to manufacturing conventions, a kinematician looking 
at this diagram spotted something else as well. The shape of the teeth is 
common enough- perhaps a zoo pressure angle. But there turn out to 
be physical limits to how few teeth can be meshed with 53 teeth without 
interference. For a zoo pressure angle, that number is 16. With 13 teeth as 
drawn, the interference will be such that the gears lock up. 
Figure l.lb Detail of Custom Gear Train (53:13) 
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To prevent interference, the teeth of the smaller gear must be "un-
dercut" -indented a bit so as to allow the corners of the big gear teeth to 
rotate past as the gears turn. Undercutting gears may have an effect on 
load, since the smaller teeth are weakened. Real-world designers must ask, 
"What does the problem as posed presume about the load to be placed on 
this gear train?" 
Okay, suppose we follow the standard methodology for gear train 
design and replace Figure 1.1 with the following stock gears. 
Gear 1, 52 teeth 
FIGURE 1.2 A "Stock'' Gear Train (52: 16) 
Are we ready to solve? Maybe. Even the naked eye may be able to 
see that the "off the shelf" gears of Figure 1.2 appear to need undercut-
ting. Moreover, we still don't know what kind of problem we are facing. 
Is Figure 1.2 simply a thought experiment? Or is it a proposed design for 
some application in the real world where things bind, bend, break off, 
melt, and so on? If the application is real, we must ask: is the speed of 
Gear A at t0 real or merely assumed? Perhaps a client gave specs on the 
basis of assumptions rather than facts. This wouldn't be the first client to 
have insisted on faulty specs! If we are intending to solve on the basis of 
the unverified assumptions of a client, then we are once again forgetting 
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to be engineers, because engineers must pose a host of clarifying questions 
to the client: 
Is the motor that drives Gear A running at t0 or is it at rest? 
How long does it take for Gear A to achieve 108 rpm (i.e., 3.67! rad/ 
sec)? After how many revolutions can acceleration be ignored? 
How much "play" is in each bearing? If the bearings are liable to hu-
man adjustments, is there too much or too little play? Or is the play 
"just right" - as is the case with sealed bearings? Similarly, if the bear-
ings are adjustable, then are the bearings adequately lubricated? (Or 
are we using sealed bearings?) 
• How great a load is on the motor? After all, 108 rpm is quite slow as 
far as motors go. Is this a fast motor being made to work slowly by a 
large load? If so, bearing wear over time may be an important factor 
as t increases. 
• Does the load vary? 
What is the temperature of the surrounding medium? What is the 
turbulence of the surrounding medium? 
Is the mechanism underwater? Underwater?! The diagram says noth-
ing about the mechanism being underwater. But do clients always 
volunteer all the crucial details? Or do engineers need to extract per-
tinent information from sometimes unwitting clients? 
And so on . . . 
These questions seem like trick questions, even traps. For asking 
questions like these, engineers are often branded as "glass-half-empty" 
pessimists. But in the real world, gear trains are not ideal. To think they 
are ideal would be to make a huge mistake. ("Real" is the actual, everyday 
world we live in where things bind, scorch, melt, break off, and generally 
fall apart. Mathematics may be used to approximate the real world- and 
not the other way around.) 
For example, in 1986 General Electric switched from reciprocal 
compressors to rotary compressors in their refrigerators. They made the 
switch knowing that rotary compressors require more power and oper-
ate at higher speeds. But GE presumed that even at these higher speeds, 
rotary action was inherently closer to an "ideal" than reciprocal action 
and therefore inherently better. This sounds almost as if GE assumed ro-
tary compressors behave ideally, as if they perfectly mimicked a technical 
5 
BY DESIGN 
drawing of contextless gear trains comprised of frictionless revolute joints. 
Technicians reported no failures during the testing phase. But when the 
techs said that something about the new compressors "didn't look right 
either;' GE decision-makers roundly ignored the lowly techs. Eventually 
these compressors did begin to fail. Twelve short months after one million 
refrigerators had been sold, the long-term effects of operating at higher 
speeds (and thus higher temperatures) became painfully visible: compres-
sors bound, melted, broke, and burned out. It cost GE $450,000,000 to 
replace the defective compressors.4 
Back to our ideal gear train in Figure 1.1. When facing the problem 
oflocating Pat t
60
, one student will answer "8 = 6(2n)l13 rad:' Another in-
terrupts with a string of questions. Which student gives the better response 
to the problem? Well, doesn't it depend on who is doing the asking and 
under what conditions? If we are in the classroom, we know that the ideal 
case can be diagrammed: point masses, frictionless bearings, instanta-
neous acceleration, infinitely solid grounding for revolute joints, etc. The 
ideal case has a single true answer, "For w = 3.6n rad/sec, P 60 is shown to 
bee= 6(2n)/13 rad:' This answer can be delivered with certitude, because 
the ideal mechanism follows mathematically precise rules. These rules 
govern the ideal device with complete authority. In the ideal case, there 
is no wobble in the bearings because the bearings are completely snug yet 
frictionless. And yet . .. 
IDEAL- WoRLD ErH ICS? 
Some people think, mistakenly in my book, that ethics is like the study 
of the rules governing the ideal mechanism. For these thinkers, a great 
deal of effort has gone into explicating the rules-even with mathematical 
precision, wherever possible. On this view, the job of the professional ethi-
cist is to answer questions such as, "If human interaction is like an ideal 
mechanism, what rules govern person-to-person interactions?" Of course, 
human beings are not really mechanisms, and they concede that human 
interactions will sometimes deviate from the ideal, especially when they 
fail to follow the rules. But can ethics be modeled on the ideal? To find out, 
let's take a closer look at one of these ideal-world models. 
One proposed rule is this: human beings are obligated to behave in 
the manner that maximizes the likelihood of yielding the most quantifi-
able beneficial consequence for the greatest number of people. This rule, 
"maximize net quantifiable goodness;' is given by a series of calculations: 
6 
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n. 
X 
Net G = ~ (likelihood)(goodness)(significance) 
1 
1 
EQUATION 1.1: Calculating Net Goodness for course of action x, where n 
= the number of outcomes for course of action x, and 1 =likelihood, g = 
goodness, and s = significance of each given outcome n 
Suppose the boss has moved up a deadline that I was already strug-
gling to meet. If I'm to stay on pace, I'll necessarily have to work longer 
hours than I'm already working- longer into the evenings (forget about 
my kids' soccer games) and big chunks of the weekend (forget about 
that anniversary getaway). On first thought four courses of action seem 
possible. I can (a) work the hours and take the lumps with my spouse 
and children; (b) appeal to workmates to help with my present task in 
exchange for the promise to help them out in the future; (c) say to the 
boss, "As you wish!" but in reality make no adjustments and simply fail 
to make deadline (perhaps I can apologize for this later); or (d) stridently 
refuse the boss's request, underlining my feelings by punching the boss in 
the nose. If these are my possible courses of action, then in the terms of 
the formula, x = 4. 
Each course of action will have consequences of varying degrees of 
likelihood. For example, we can imagine that d (punch the boss in the 
nose) may result in one or more of the following: (1) I get fired; (2) I'm 
sued for bodily injury; (3) I break my hand; (4) I feel really good about 
myself; (5) I'm admired by my colleagues, who go on strike in solidarity 
with me until the boss is fired and I am promoted as the new boss. For this 
course of action (punching the boss), the possible number of outcomes 
listed is five (n = 5). 
For each of these three outcomes a likelihood (l) is predicted and as-
signed a numerical value (such as "a 75 percent chance of occurrence:') 
The goodness (g) of an outcome is a simple binary quantity: + 1 if it is a 
good thing, -1 if it is a bad thing.5 In the case of punching the boss, the 
first three outcomes listed are bad, or -1, but the last two are good, or+ 1. 
Finally, the significance of the outcome is assigned a numerical rank-
ing, say 1 for something trivial and 10 for something of grave importance. 
Getting fired is pretty serious- but not as bad as dying or being sued. So, 
perhaps we'll give it an 8. Being sued is worse than getting fired (since 
7 
BY DESIGN 
it goes on my permanent record), but not as bad as dying. So a 9 seems 
about right. Breaking one or more fingers is painful and inconvenient, but 
not as severe as losing the job. Let's give it a significance level of 5. Feeling 
good about myself is pleasant, but not more pleasant than a broken hand 
is painful; let's say a 3. Finally, my promotion into the place of my former 
boss is pretty sweet, maybe even a 9% out of 10. 
The likelihood of being fired is probably 90 percent or better; the 
chance of being sued depends on the boss's personality- let's say 75 per-
cent. And the risk of breaking my hand stands at about 50- 50. The chances 
of feeling temporarily very good are extremely high- the adrenalin rush 
virtually guarantees (100 percent) a brief elation. But the solidarity of my 
peers resulting in my promotion is extremely unlikely; let's say on the or-
der of a 2 percent chance. Now we can do the math: 
Net G for Action,1 = ( -1)(8)(.90)+( -1)(9)(.75)+( -1)(5)(.50)+(1)(3) 
(1.0)+(1)(9.5)(.02) = -13.26 
Of course we are only one-fourth the way done. Ifi can only think of 
four possible courses of action, then x = 4 and I will generate four different 
calculations, four different Net G's. Thus the calculation must be repeated 
for the other three courses of action. Let's try one more calculation, say for 
Course of Action1, a.k.a. "do the work but take the lumps at home:' Four 
possible outcomes: keep my job ( +8 at 100 percent); my wife takes the kids 
and leaves me (-9.9 at 10 percent); I am fined by the city for not mowing 
my lawn in a timely fashion ( -2 at 15 percent); and having to cook for 
myself in my wife's absence, I lose 20 lbs. ( +5 at 60 percent). 
Net G for Action 1 = ( + 1)(8)(1.0)+( -1)(9.9)(.10)+( -1)(2)(.15)+(1)(5) 
(.6) = +0.8 
After having carefully calculated the outcomes for these two courses 
of action, the obligatory thing to do according to this brand of consequen-
tialism (called "utilitarianism") is to give in to the boss and take my lumps 
on the home front. Why is this the "best" option? Because 0.8 > -13.26. 
One can see that if the scales are the same in each case (i.e., I ranges 
from 0 to 100 percent, g = + 1 or -1, and s ranges from 1 to 10 ), then the 
goodness of an outcome can be quantitatively compared to other outcomes 
predicted for taking this course of action. The result of summing these 
values is the net G for that course of action. This string of calculations is 
repeated for each possible course of action; the course of action with the 
biggest total "wins;' which is to say- or so this theory claims- the one 
with the biggest total is revealed to be the morally obligatory course to take. 
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OBJECTIONS TO THE ID EAL-WO RLD MODEL OF ETH ICS 
Of course, there are bow1d to be enormous problems with the quantifica-
tion of moral value. After all, likelihood is terrifically difficult to predict in 
advance. Why? Because we do not live in an ideal world, but in a complex 
and chaotic one. "Complexity" and "chaos" are technical terms that mean 
no physical system, especially no living system, is entirely predictable.6 
This is not the same as saying nothing is predictable. (The flight of a base-
ball is pretty nearly a parabola.) The key term is entirely. Saying that no 
physical system is entirely predictable means that prognostication runs 
up against a limit_? But those who insist on thinking in ideal terms resist 
this conclusion and instead concoct ways for dismissing all the W1knowns. 
The most common strategy for dealing with unknowns in a decision-
making scheme is to restrict the calculation to outcomes with a fixed like-
lihood, usually those conceded as certain (I = 100 percent). "This strategy 
means that the entire burden of comparative reasoning falls upon cor-
rectly ranking the relative significance (s) of each outcome. Of course, the 
idealists must be careful: assigning rankings can itself be a way to beat the 
odds. Since numerical rankings mathematically guarantee the conclusion, 
one might be tempted to play around with them until one gets what is 
wanted. In hopes of safeguarding against cheats, the idealists insist that the 
ranking be performed in the most publicly accessible denominator known 
to humankind: money. 
Remember, the idealists want to perform a calculation of Net Good-
ness. If goodness is a simple + 1 or -1, and likelihood is fixed at 100 percent, 
then the only remaining difficulty is in measuring significance. Unfortu-
nately, in hedging the system against tmpredictability and cheats, idealist 
decision-makers have inserted economics into the fray. The problem is 
this: Is market value a genuine measure of significance? Philosopher Caro-
line Whitbeck points out that we regularly do make various kinds of value 
judgments; "Van Gogh is a good painter;' "Godel's proof is a good one;' 
"Reading the Bible is good for you:' No doubt, each of these claims will 
have its objectors. Nevertheless, each claim is fully intelligible. We readily 
understand, and just as readily argue over, aesthetic, logical, and religious 
value claims. But as Whitbeck points out, none of these value claims trans-
late into dollar signs. Van Gogh was a good painter before his paintings 
sold for millions. 
Here's the rub: Ascribing monetary "value" is really not an ascription 
of value. Monetary "value" does not reflect value; it only reflects what the 
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economic market can bear. That being the case, the reliance on monetary 
value may lead one astray who attempts to perform a calculation for Net 
Goodness (as per Equation 1.1). Famously, in the late 1970s defense attor-
neys for Ford Motor Company argued that the corporation was blameless 
in the burn deaths resulting from exploding gasoline tanks in Pinto cars 
and light trucks.8 They employed Equation 1 to make the case that Ford 
did exactly what the numbers obliged them to do: nothing. 
The legal case boiled down to two courses of action: (1) recall and 
repair 11 million Pintos, and 1.5 million light trucks with the same de-
sign, by installing a bladder in the gas tank costing a measly $11, or (2) do 
nothing and settle each lawsuit for wrongful death and property loss on a 
case-by-case basis. Let's do the numbers: 
Outcomes (n = 3) Likelihood Goodness Significance NetG1 
180 burn deaths 100 percent -1 $200,000 -$36M 
180 serious burn injuries 100 percent - 1 $67,000 -$12M 
2,100 damaged vehicles 100 percent - 1 $700 -$1.5 M 
NetG = -$49.5 M 
FIGURE 1.3 Course of Action 1: Do Nothing 
Outcomes (n = 2) Likelihood Goodness Significance NetG2 
11 million cars 100 percent -1 $11 -$122M 
1.5 million light trucks 100 percent -1 $11 -$16.5 M 
NetG= -$137.5 M 
FIGURE 1.4 Course of Action 2: Recall and Repair with $11 Tank Bladder 
Astute readers often wonder whether the attorneys lowballed the 
numbers. And why were only two courses of action considered? Surely 
multiple courses of action were open to Ford once it learned of the design 
flaw. But for the moment, let's stay focused on whether "value" can be mea-
sured in dollars. In the Pinto case, the market supplied the data for both 
the value of a used Pinto ($700) and human loss of life ($200,000). When 
adjusted for inflation,9 the approximate value of life in today's dollars 
would have been placed at $635,000. This figure pales in comparison to the 
present market value of human life established by the EPA: $9,100,000! 10 
10 
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Had Ford used the tenfold higher "value" in its calculations, it would have 
concluded that the morally obligatory course of action was to recall and 
repair all the tanks. (Just the 180 burn deaths at $7.9 million produces a 
negative quantity of $1.4 billion, which is almost ten times more than the 
cost of fixing the tanks!) As it was, Ford used the 1978 market value for life 
and concluded that, morally speaking, they were in the clear. 
Such discrepancy doesn't sit well with us. My older brother owned a 
Pinto back in the late seventies. Can I really believe that Ford would have 
been blameless had he died in 1978 but guilty if he had died in 2010 simply 
because the market value for his life had increased? Of course not. Our 
instinct is completely correct- loss of life is always an inestimably bad 
thing regardless of the market's price tag. (Nevertheless, culture asks engi-
neering firms to move forward with designs that are merely "safe enough:' 
A maximally safe airplane could never get off the ground.) 
Equation 1.1 is called consequentialist because it is concerned with 
the outcomes or consequences of a given moral decision. When one uses 
it to help make a moral decision, one has to deal frankly with the inher-
ent uncertainties of the equation. The form of the equation used by Ford's 
attorneys is called cost-benefit analysis. As we have seen, it discounts 
uncertainty in the likelihood column by considering only those outcomes 
that can be conceded as given (l = 100 percent). An alternative strategy for 
dealing with uncertainty in the equation is to fix the significance column 
(s) instead of the likelihood. In other words, instead of conceding that 
certain outcomes are bound to happen and then assign a market value to 
each outcome, the alternative focuses on only one outcome- for example, 
loss of life- and then works to give precision to prediction of likelihood. 
Accuracy in prediction is attainable only when vast pools of data are avail-
able. For example, actuaries working for large insurance companies can 
show that the statistical chance of a red car crashing is slightly higher than 
the chance of a blue one crashing. No one knows for sure why. But given 
the millions of crashes by blue and red cars, the statistical difference in 
their rate of incidence is not negligible. This approach is called risk-benefit 
analysis. Risk-benefit analysis avoids the problem of "market value" be-
cause it is based on real-world data rather than the fluctuation of markets. 
Unfortunately, risk-benefit analysis cheats on the other end of the spec-
trum by severely restricting itself to immediate (or at least short-range) 
outcomes. But is this inherently more fair than the kind of confusion that 
"market value" injects? 
11 
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Imagine a biologist considering taking a vacation cruise in the In-
dian Ocean. Socially minded fanatical friends urge the biologist not to go. 
Rather, they plead, the biologist ought to cash in her tickets and donate 
the money to relief efforts for the 1.5 million refugees still (in 2011) left 
homeless as a result of the 2009 Haitian earthquake. Ordinarily, we would 
say that the surrender of the price of one's vacation to charity is a noble 
deed. Such a gift might conceivably save many human lives. By lowering 
incidents of death, the risk-benefit form of the equation decrees that giving 
away the cruise money is even the obligatory thing to do. 
But wait a minute. It is also conceivable, though in no way knowable, 
that a much-needed vacation might have a more beneficial longer-range 
result. Perhaps while the cruise ship is anchored in the bay, the biologist 
takes a day trip to the coast that brings her into contact with the farming 
practices of a local people, which in turn redirects her own research, re-
sulting in the production of a pesticide that vastly increases grain harvests 
and feeds many more people than could have been fed by the surrender of 
the price of her ticket. 11 What I have done here is reminiscent of the work 
of ethicist Bernard Williams, who was fond of complicating apparently 
straightforward ethical calculations by the telling of simple, but realistic, 
stories about how we really live. 12 All such realistic tales remind us that 
the very best moral reasoning must consider the intangibles- those fac-
tors that we can neither predict in advance nor easily place a value upon, 
perhaps because they are longer-ranged than can be presently seen. · 
Williams's point about the importance of including such intangibles 
becomes persuasive when we consider the messy world that we live in with 
all its hurly-burly. But if we slip into thinking of the world in terms of ideal 
mechanisms, we may unwittingly overlook some of the very most impor-
tant factors. Given the innumerable ways things can bind, melt, or break 
off, it seems unlikely that a good analogy for real-world ethics is that of an 
ideal mechanism. Fortunately, there is another way. As we shall see, this 
way is much closer to real-world engineering than to an ideal mechanism. 
THE MESSY WORLD 
Consider a second mechanical example, that of a Bianchi racing bicycle 
ridden by a fortysomething male competing in "Ride the Bear;' a 105-mile 
road race over the highest paved road in Southern California. The prob-
lem of pressure angle disappears because the gear train has been replaced 
by chain and sprocket. 
12 
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FIGURE 1.5 Bianchi Racing Bicycle with Rear Cassette Ratio 53:13 
The ratio between the two sprockets is the same as in Figure 1.1, al-
though in this case another member (the 700 mm wheel) has been added 
to the train. (In addition, the chain drive means that the rear cassette 
[sprocket] rotates counterclockwise, matching that of the chain ring.) The 
front chain ring has 53 teeth, which gives the racer a slight advantage on 
the flats over rivals who ride models that typically have 52-teeth chain 
rings. A smaller chain ring is available for climbing hills (it has 42 teeth; 
real bikers sneer at a 39-teeth chain ring-a.k.a. "Granny gear" -even for 
steep mountain climbs!). 
Owners of racing bikes also have options for the sizes of their rear 
sprocket set (cassette). An easy set has sprockets with 25-23-21-19-17-15 
teeth. The largest sprocket (25) makes for easier uphill climbing. Similarly, 
a set with much smaller ratios (e.g., 21-19-17-15-13-11-9 teeth) will give 
the rider more downhill velocity but will be more difficult to pedal. The 23-
21-19-17-15-13 set on this particular Bianchi was a good compromise for 
me. As the owner of this seafoam-green Bianchi, I had the entire middle 
range of ratios covered and had no problem climbing aggressively (forty-
five miles of "The Bear" was uphill). But my top speed was capped at 52 
mph. Unless I was in free fall, I could only go as fast as I could spin; and 
it was physically impossible for my then fortysomething body to exceed a 
short-burst cadence of 145 rpms (which for 700 mm tires and a maximum 
gear ratio of 53:13 produced P ove = 52 mph). 
13 
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Seen from the view of a cyclist, none of the interrupting questions 
raised about the ideal gear train in Figure 1.1 are insignificant. The "load" 
on the "motor" is constantly varying as terrain shifts. So, "instant accelera-
tion" was impossible, as was steady cadence (w only approximates 220n ;we 
rad/min.). Friction is constantly the enemy. Having one's bottom bracket 
properly adjusted for optimum range of play was crucially important. (Had 
my Bianchi not been a classic, I'd have opted in a heartbeat for the modern 
sealed-bearing bottom bracket.) Bearings are always in danger of binding 
and overheating and scoring their races. The ticking noise that developed 
in my bottom bracket was not only the symptom of its eventual demise; 
it also reminded me that this was not a frictionless system I was pedaling. 
Air temperature- which in Southern Cal could easily top 100°F- was im-
portant data to consider when strategizing how to keep the human "mo-
tor" from overheating. (Overheating from lack of water was obviously of 
greater concern than "bonking;' or "hitting the wall;' which results from 
lack of food. When both aerobic and anaerobic fuel have been digested, 
the body begins to digest itself.) Ironically, when we reached Lake Ar-
rowhead, almost a vertical mile higher than the start, the temperature was 
in the low 40s) . Nor were air speeds negligible. Obviously, if ambient air is 
still, racers create their own headwind. But with the added bluster of the 
seasonal Santa Anas, the gusts of which top 50 mph, keeping one's bal-
ance was almost as challenging as making headway. (When the Santa Anas 
swept down Devil's Canyon during an earlier training ride, I had to stand 
up in first gear on the flats .) And stability of the "motor mounts" are of no 
small consequence: when my head tube tore in half (apparently a failure 
long in the making) on a particularly steep training ride, my "motor" lost 
perhaps one-third of its climbing power, since I could no longer pull on 
my handle bars nor safely throw the frame from side to side. 
All questions about context, which rudely interrupt so-called ideal 
design, are parameters that cannot be ignored if one wants to be a happy 
biker. "Happy" or "successful" or "good" cycling has only minimally to do 
with "rules" (obey traffic laws; be courteous to fellow riders by pointing 
out road debris when they are drafting, etc.). Moreover, happy cycling also 
has relatively little to do with the principles that have been extrapolated 
for the ideal mechanism. 13 But it has everything to do with real-world 
messiness: incompletely described scenarios littered with imperfect data 
and ever-changing conditions. This messiness is the terrain that all hu-
man beings share. Mechanical engineering prof Billy V. Koen says that 
coping with the messiness of the real world makes us all "engineers" of a 
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sort. Human reasoning is none other than the engineering method. Thus 
Koen describes the engineering method as "a strategy for causing the best 
change in a poorly understood situation within the available resources:' 14 
In this book we are going to scrap the idea of ethics as the ideal case 
and look at ethics as something messier. Ethics is more like the real-world 
activity of designing and racing bicycles than it is calculating e for p 60 on 
a technical drawing. But we must be careful! At every step along the way, 
we will be sorely tempted by the sheer attractive simplicity of the "ideal" 
case. One way to counter this temptation is to constantly force ourselves 
to "look and see:' We must always ask ourselves, "What is really going on 
here?" 
For example, think of how engineering students are initially taught 
design. At least on the first pass, design is typically taught as a straight-line 
process. From the textbook diagrams it is easy to imagine that one turns 
the crank at one end and out pops the innovation at the other end. Con-
sider Figure 1.6 on the following page, depicting the "science" of design 
from a standard text. 
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Conceptualization 
Analysis 
Distribution 
FIGURE 1.6 A Typical Diagram Depicting the "Science" of Design 15 
Now, to be fair to the professors, it is common practice to initiate stu-
dents into new material with ideal types and later ramp up the complexity 
of description as students get a more realistic grip on things. (Hopefully, 
you have already met some of these correctives in your more advanced 
coursework.) Notice in this diagram that the design process is laid out like 
a production sequence on an assembly line. Because we are already prone 
to interpret technical drawings as ideal machines, to use such a diagram of 
the design process misleads some into thinking that design is analogous to 
an ideal mechanism (predictable, clear boundaries, etc.). 
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As they learn, students hopefully graduate to better diagrams, ones 
that depict the interaction between "stages" as bidirectional, with double 
arrows indicating feedback loops from subsequent stages.16 At one point 
in his publishing, Stuart Pugh used something like the following diagram 
to convey the design process. 
Etc., ... 
FIGURE 1.7 Design Core17 
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You'll notice two things. First, there are bidirectio.nal arrows, which indi-
cate conversation between subsequent stages. Of course, the small size of 
these arrows relative to the whole seems to suggest that cross-level con-
versations are at best concessions and at worst interruptions to the overall 
march toward production, shown by the thick, black downward arrows. 
Second, the parameters-what Pugh will later call "design boundaries"-
are not only rankable, they have been given clear ranking (A through 
G, "in order of importance"). But of course, in the real world things are 
much messier than this. All "stages" have feedback into all other stages. 
And rankings of design boundaries can only be definitively completed 
retrospectively. That means it is artificial to say when one stage ends and 
another begins. Of course, without identifiable stages, the diagram falls 
apart and ceases to teach anything at all. So the diagram may hint at design 
as a regular process, but design doesn't really happen this way. 
Oddly enough, designers seem to get along just fine despite inhabit-
ing an undiagrammable situation. Real-world design is not straight-line, 
or even bidirectional; it is "loopy:' There are iterations of conversations 
between various stages. However, these iterations are not inherently con-
vergent, like iterations of the algorithm for calculating the square root of 
2. Successive iterations of the square root algorithm give an increasingly 
precise answer. But in the design process, sometimes further iterations of 
conversations between stages corrupt, even ruin, a good design. Conse-
quently, teams need to figure out when to stop iterating. But the "time to 
stop" is itself a metric whose optimum cannot be spelled out in advance. 
Messy, yes? 
In addition to the linearity implied about design, there is a second 
danger lurking in the oversimple diagram. Such diagrams make it look as 
though the terms in which the project is negotiated are clear to everyone at 
each step along the way. Obviously, there will be disagreements to be sort-
ed out. But the diagram makes it appear that the terms of negotiation are 
understood by each player: "What problem are we solving? What are we 
making? How will it function? What metrics ought to be optimized? What 
issues are open for negotiation? Who has what stake in the outcome?" 
And so on. But answers to these questions are all achieved- sometimes 
very slowly and painfully-over time. 
So, what is design really like? Perhaps design is a bit like a medieval 
quest, like the search for the Holy Grail. With only the vaguest of ideas 
about what is sought (What's a "grail"?), a team of relative strangers, whose 
powers- both singly and together- are untested or uncertain, launch off 
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in some direction. Along the way tests will be faced that will prove mettle, 
hone skills, clarify what they seek, and reveal how best to keep seeking. 
A map (or "diagram") could only be constructed retrospectively, after the 
deed is done. In other words, even if a map had been available at the outset 
of the quest, the nature of a quest is such that, on the front end of the jour-
ney, the questers would have been as mystified by the map as they were 
by the journey itself. (If a group knows where they are going, how to get 
there, and what they are after, we say they are taking a "trip" rather than 
going on a quest.) And perhaps engineers often enough require "trips" 
rather than quests. But we must stay open to the possibility that engineer-
ing design often has a quest-like character in order to learn what this is. 
The real world is messy. As wonderful and powerful as mathematics 
and the hard sciences are, they do not perfectly describe the actual world 
we live in. We live in the messy one. And engineers make the amazing 
progress they do by remembering that it isn't the real world that approxi-
mates math and science. Rather, math and science are the approximations. 
Don't misw1derstand: math and science are the very best approximations 
we can possibly have. In fact, we ought to work hard to mathematically 
model not only, say, general principles of kinematics, but also all the im-
perfections involved, such as acceleration (dv!dt) and friction (f.l-) and so 
on. And of course, advanced models do begin to account for these devia-
tions. rs But the important difference between scientists and engineers is 
that whereas science aspires to express an ideal world, engineers use both 
math and science as tools for approximating the real world we actually 
live in. That is why the final bar for the engineer is never a theory or a 
mathematical model, but "look and see": Does it work? Does it work well 
enough? This is not to say that idealized models ought to be completely 
ignored. Most often, an ideal picture clears the workspace for design; pro-
posals that defy the ideal picture do not even make it onto the table. Most 
often- but not always. For there are cases in which engineering precedes 
science. James Watt had a functioning steam engine long before the first 
thermodynamics text was written. And centuries before Bernoulli, Eilmer 
of Malmesbury glided six hundred feet wearing homemade bird's wings! L9 
(He was quite possibly the only one ever to succeed. Sadly, he broke both 
legs in landing and remained crippled the rest of his life.) An infamous 
episode in the history of civil engineering illustrates the bewitching mys-
tique of the ideal picture. 
Early in the twentieth century, road building, like many other fields 
in engineering, depended on a "look-and-see" approach. That is, the 
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skilled eye and trained hand of the experienced practitioner constituted 
an "empirically derived understanding of nature:'20 In other words, what 
counted as expertise inside civil engineering resided in the know-how of 
the expert practitioner. Unfortunately, what outsiders wanted was numeri-
cal proof.2 1 Without "proof" people mistook engineering for a "low-tech" 
enterprise, forever destined to be less respectable than the more quantita-
tive and "scientific" fields such as electricity (for which the mathematical 
ideal governs more closely). Some civil engineers felt the urge to "keep up 
with the Joneses" and tried to justify the expertise they already possessed 
in their fingertips by collecting numerical data to prove to outsiders what 
they themselves already knew. This turned out to be a wild goose chase. 
So, for a time, the federal Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) scrapped the 
field-testing of new road materials and designs. Rather, they moved the 
data gathering into a controlled lab environment in the search for repeat-
able numerical results. For example, the BPR devised a complex machine 
for simulating the way a truck pounds pavement. The device numerically 
measured the impact made by a heavy weight falling two inches (the sort 
of blow a truck delivers when it drives off a two-inch plank). The device 
was then complexified to simulate any size truck. Yet in order to keep 
the experiment properly "scientific;' only one variable (weight of vehicle, 
height of drop, thickness of pavement, the type of underlying soil, etc.) 
could be altered per trial. After months, even years, of testing, the BPR had 
collected exhaustive data- but only for a single kind of subsoil! Drainage 
of the soil was not even on the radar. Nor was the effect of the recoil action 
of truck springs initially considered. Still, federal road builders doggedly 
followed the BPR data and began constructing roadways that were thick at 
the center- where the wheels touched most often-and thin at the edges. 
Fortunately, a number of states, perhaps too poor to afford the equip-
ment and too much in a hurry to wait for yet more federal experiments, 
simply laid down sixty-eight sections of road, each about fifty yards long, 
with various designs, thicknesses, materials, soils, and drainage patterns, 
and then assigned a fleet of trucks (from 2,500- 13,500 lbs.) to drive on it 
nonstop. Eventually, fifty of the sections were pounded into failure. The 
surviving eighteen sections were deemed superior designs. Some of the 
results were intuitive (e.g., concrete outperformed brick). But one result 
was startling: the best road design was one that was thick at the edges and 
thin in the middle, the very opposite of the conclusion demanded by BPR's 
theoretical ideal. 
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The lesson to be learned? Don't succumb to the bewitchment of 
thinking you have the ideal answer. In an ideal picture, or an idealized 
model, there is always the implication that if we look hard enough, we'll 
find the single correct solution. But in the messy world, things are differ-
ent. This is not to say that anything goes. In the absence of a single correct 
solution, we are not thereby free to do whatever pleases or amuses us. 
No! Some proposals are clearly wrong. (For example, those that simply do 
not work or cannot be built.) However, there may be more than one right 
solution. In all fields of engineering the activity taken in response to the 
messiness of the actual world, when no answer is to be found in the back 
of the book, is the real field of engineering design. 
CONVERSATION Is CRUCIAL TO DESIGN 
In this book we shall discover that engineering ethics is analogous to real-
world engineering design . There is no substitute for actually doing design 
work en route to learning what design is. But short of field experience, 
we shall have to rely on the observations of those who have taken the 
trouble to "look and see:' Louis Bucciarelli, professor at MIT, has done just 
that. After shadowing three different teams doing three unique projects 
for three separate firms, Bucciarelli was able to spell out why design was 
neither straight-line nor ideal. His short answer is that design is a social 
enterprise that at its core is a conversation spoken in a language of its own 
invention. How thoroughly does conversation impinge on good design? 
On Bucciarelli's view, to the extent that designers talk unwillingly or in-
completely, design will inevitably succumb to entropy, or "design degrada-
tion:' We know that degradation certainly enters through manufacturing 
stages of engineering.22 But Bucciarelli observed that degradation can 
result not only from short cuts in manufacturing, but also at the design 
table. This is plausible if we remember that designers are neither omni-
scient nor morally perfect. Perhaps one designer unwittingly competes 
with others.23 Or perhaps another's emphasis on cost reduction conflicts 
with someone else's goal of going green. Only in the classroom does the as-
signing of weights for evaluation happen a priori (which is to say, prior to 
looking and seeing). In the real world these metrics must be negotiated.24 
Sometimes these negotiations are both risky and painful.25 
Depending upon student maturity, design may be introduced to the 
students by any number of helpful first-order approximations: there are 
straight-line models, ones that describe overlapping phases, ones governed 
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by computational algorithms, and so on. Whatever pedagogical model is 
employed, novice students first encounter "design" in the abstract, cut off 
from actual persons who do actual design work. But real-world engineer-
ing design doesn't happen in the abstract any more than it happens by 
itself. So, engineering students must graduate to the realization that design 
is something that people do. It doesn't make sense to talk about "design'' 
without at the same time talking about people. Each person at the table 
brings his or her unique blend of skills to the task. But people also com-
plicate things. 
Bucciarelli observed that at the outset, each designer, whatever the 
team, conceives the to-be-completed "object" in ways that differ from her 
compatriots. In Bucciarelli's words, each team member inhabits her own 
"object world:' The activity of design means bringing our object worlds 
together by talking long enough until the worlds begin to blend. But at the 
outset, team members are almost consigned to speak foreign languages 
with each other.26 
Perhaps Plato can help us understand Bucciarelli's point. Plato once 
told a parable about blind persons each describing one part of an elephant 
by touch and then drawing conclusions about the whole elephant! Feeling 
a stout leg: "This beast is like a tree!" Feeling the long nose: "This beast 
is like a snake!" The same sort of thing might happen if each participant 
spoke a different language in addition to being blind. It would take a very 
long time to come to terms if everyone were describing the elephant's parts 
spoke a different language. But Bucciarelli is not talking about French or 
English. He isn't even thinking about different dialects. He is referring to 
sublanguages within English. Since none of us know the half-million or so 
words in the English language, it seems likely that entire conversations go 
on without us being able to understand a single sentence. So, there may 
be many, many more sublanguages that might be in play than we might 
first imagine. Still, it's hard to believe Bucciarelli when he says that even 
within a design firm, like IDEO or OXO, each designer speaks a language 
unique to her. But perhaps the best policy for our investigation is to "look 
and see:' 
For example, in the now famous five-day redesign of a shopping cart, 
the design firm IDEO utilized a team in which engineers were outnumbered 
by non-engineers (such as linguists, biologists, marketers, psychologists, 
etc.). Some will say that IDEO takes this mixed sublanguage approach to 
the extreme. But Bucciarelli observes that the multiple-languages problem 
plays out even in ordinary engineering firms in which every designer is 
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an engineer by training. 27 While both electrical engineers and mechanical 
engineers have taken calculus, electrical engineers inhabit a quite differ-
ent object world than do mechanical engineers. Here is a simple example: 
"resistance" means one thing when talking about a gear train and another 
when talking about an electronic circuit. 
The challenge of a team's eventually achieving fully functional com-
munication about design- whether the intended artifact is a shopping cart 
or a large-scale real-time X-ray inspection machine- is not easy. Getting 
everyone on the same page is not a simple compromise over vocabulary. 
Nor did Bucciarelli observe designers using a fat dictionary to translate 
from X's world to Y's and from Y's to Z's. Rather, in the world of design, a 
team evolves its own unique sublanguage. Bucciarelli reports that this often 
is "a matter of convention and custom;' involving "curious practices and 
forms of expression as well as tokens and grammar, jargon and idiom;' 
not to mention sketches, analogies, metaphors, models, and prototypes.28 
In short, the design team evolves its own mother tongue.29 And the only 
way to learn it is by immersion. One has to participate in design in order 
to become fluent. This may take time, but achieving fluency is worth it. 
Granted, designers probably won't describe their gains in terms of "flu-
encY:' But they will notice that their work with each other has begun to 
"click:' 
Here are some of Bucciarelli's observations on the way design 
work "clicks;' which is to say, the way designers evolve their own design 
language. 30 
1. The language spoken by the team becomes somewhat "self-contained:' 
Outsiders to the team do not have an automatic ability to understand 
what the team is talking about without direct participation in the 
group. In fact, early on designers quickly discover that direct transla-
tion from each proper object language to another (say from electrical 
engineering to marketing) is simply not possible. Consequently, in 
order for one designer to communicate to her peers, she must resort 
to vernacular rather than her own technical object-world languageY 
2. Outsiders find that the best way to learn the team's evolving language 
is to approach it like a foreign language and learn fluency by immer-
sion. Granted, some of the language is codified in handbooks, stan-
dards, and textbooks that are widely accessible to outsiders. (Thus, for 
example, as a bicycle racer I shared a small overlapping understand-
ing with mechanical engineers who designed the bike and technicians 
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who kept it running.) But these "canons" are not exhaustive. (Even if 
they were exhaustive, a book couldn't tell one which vernacular use 
of a term [e.g., "resistance"] is in play. You may have already met this 
phenomenon while reading the history of science. Compare early 
modern conceptions of "ether" with CH30CH3, or late nineteenth-
century definitions of "force" with F = rna.) Some of what makes for 
"good" design in the task at hand cannot be understood except as the 
language is learned on location by means of the hands-on activity of 
designing. 
3. As might be expected, mathematics shows up a lot in technical object 
worlds. However, Bucciarelli observed that the mathematics of one 
designer's "world" only resembles the math of another world, since 
the particulars to which math is applied may comprise distinct sub-
languages. Bluntly put, mathematics is not the universal language; it is 
more like the precondition for learning to speak. 
4. A design team's language is fluid. On the one hand, it is settled enough 
to give direction to the flow of the conversation. But like a riverbed 
that is ever shifting, so too the boundaries of a given design language 
may drift over time.32 For example, a feature that yesterday exempli-
fied "good" design may today be discarded by the design team for 
other meanings of"good:' 
5. No one person is a privileged elite with a god's-eye view or superior 
fluency that encompasses all the sublanguages spoken. "Fluency" in 
the object language of this design team is something achieved by ev-
erybody on the team, albeit haltingly. The team as a whole achieves 
fluency in their locally evolving sublanguage as each member strug-
gles to make her unique ideas intelligible by means of conversations, 
shouting matches, e-mails, diagrams, sketches on napldns, etc. 
6. Words-both ordinary and specialized vocabulary- are obviously 
crucial for mastering an evolving design language. But equally impor-
tant are sketches, prototypes, heuristics, metaphors, hands-on experi-
ence, and tacit know-how. Surprisingly, mathematical models are of-
ten idealized and thus leave off the very particulars that are needed for 
gaining tacit know-how of the object world. As a result, mathematical 
equations and technical drawings can supplement but never displace 
the need for rough-and-ready, garden-variety words. 
So we see that design involves both the ideal and the rough. In the 
main, design is something like learning to communicate with foreigners 
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without help of a dictionary. Design is decidedly not the straightforward 
application of an ideal picture. 
CONCLUSION 
If design were governed by an ideal, it is conceivable that every design 
team that responded to a RFP (request for proposal) would generate iden-
tical solutions. The likelihood that each of us has met insufferable know-it-
ails who treat their own design proposal as the only one logically possible 
does not change the reality that design is as unpredictable as it is messy. 
The outcome of design activity is not like cranking the gear train in Figure 
1.1 and asking for the location of Pw Another turn of the crank results 
in a fully predictable result. Rather, design work undertaken in response 
to a new problem turns out to be messy business. And as Bucciarelli has 
shown, design is as messy a business as learning to cross the communica-
tion gaps created by the existence of as many object worlds as there are 
team members! 
From Bucciarelli's record of his work shadowing the three design 
teams actually practicing design, one lesson that emerges is the need for 
a certain kind of personal character. In particular, there is the need for a 
basic level of trust among designers on a team.33 It is only on the basis of 
a very primitive trust that children are able to learn language from their 
parents. So, too, designers must trust in each other. In addition, they must 
trust in the common nature of the way the world works even when that 
cannot be exhaustively spelled out. Because, after all, design is this team's 
way of dealing with their world just as engineering as a whole is the hu-
man means for dealing with the messy world. In short, design is a social 
process for coping with the messy world. 31 
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 
1. Does mathematics approximate the world or does the world approxi-
mate mathematics? Why? 
2. What are the two most common forms that consequentialism takes? 
3. Under what conditions is the consequentialist formula most useful 
for decision-making in ethics? What are the limits of this formula? 
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4. What does Bucciarelli mean by the term "object worlds"? What do 
you gather Bucciarelli means by saying each design team evolves its 
own language? 
5. Why do you think one has to participate in design in order best to 
learn it? 
NOTES 
I. Live footage of the incident can be viewed on YouTube.com, e.g., 
http://www. youtube.com/watch ?v=osocGiofdvc. 
2. The diagrams of gear trains and sprocket arrangements was done with 
the help ofBingjue Lion a CAD program called "Inventor:' 
3. My guide in these matters is frequently the engineer-turned-philos-
opher Ludwig Wittgenstein. He was very concerned with a certain 
blindness we develop when we look at the world around us. "The 
machine (its structure) as symbolizing its action: the action of a 
machine-I might say at first-seems to be there in it from the start. 
What does that mean?-
"If we know the machine, everything else, that is its movement, 
seems to be already completely determined. 
"We talk as if these parts could only move in this way, as if they 
could not do anything else. How is this- do we forget the possibility 
of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on? Yes; in many cases 
we don't think of that at all:' Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
§193. 
4. This spectacular debacle is recounted in Ferguson, "How Engineers 
Lose Touch;' 16-24. 
5. This may seem overly simplified. But notice that if the goodness of an 
outcome is mixed, both good and bad, the outcome must be broken 
down into component parts that are each either entirely good or en-
tirely bad. 
6. In this book I'll use the terms "chaos" and "complexity" to refer to the 
irreducible and systematic unpredictability that tmderlies all the ap-
parent mathematical regularities of the physical world we live in. The 
fact that we cannot exhaustively predict future events except statisti-
cally (pace the popular television series Numbers) means that humans 
live in a contingent world. For further reading see Russell, Murphy, 
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and Peacocke, Chaos and Complexity. See also Juarerro, Dynamics in 
Action; Mitchell, Unsimple Truths. 
7. The French mathematician Henri Poincare showed that even in sim-
ple linear systems like billiard balls colliding, an error in the nth deci-
mal place leads to total uncertainty after n collisions. "Linear" does 
not mean "traveling in straight lines;' although billiard balls tend to 
do this. "Linear" here means solvable with simple algebra. Conserva-
tion of momentum, equations using mv, does not require differential 
equations to solve. See Polkinghorne, Science and Providence, 28- 29. 
Systems of physical measurement inevitably run up against 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Given Planck's constant, Poin-
care's work leads to the conclusion that linear systems- those solvable 
by simple algebra rather than differential equations- become entirely 
unpredictable after something on the order of 30-40 or so collisions. 
How then do Rube Goldberg devices worlc? (For example, see Honda's 
"The Cog": http:/ /www.youtube.com/watch ?v= _ ve4M4Us]Qo.) I sus-
pect that such devices have moments of "re-start"; rather than being 
actual pre-predicted chains of 50+ collisions, they are groups of short-
er chains, each ending with a binary event rather than a continuation 
of the series. For example, a good pool player may be able to regularly 
pocket a ball after three collisions. The pocketing completes the chain. 
The act of falling into the pocket is not unpredictable as if instead of 
falling into the pocket, a fourth precise collision needs to happen. 
8. The details of this case are easy to find. See, for example, Hoffman, 
"Ford Pinto:' 
9. The conversion factor for 1978 dollars is 0.314. Inflation adjustment 
data from the Web site maintained by Oregon State University: http:/ I 
oregons tate.ed u/ cia/ polisci/ individual-year -conversion-factor- tables. 
10. The numbers vary: the federal Transportation Department uses a fig-
ure close to $6 million, whereas the FDA has declared a life was worth 
$7.9 million. Appelbaum, "As U.S .. Agencies Put More Value on a Life, 
Businesses Fret:' See also Fahrenthold, "Cosmic Markdown:' 
11. This story has precedent. The Neem tree has been used for centuries 
by continental Indians as a pesticide. In 1992 W. R. Grace tried to 
establish a patent on the active ingredient derived from Neem, azadi-
rachtin. See Severance, Spiro, and Werhane, "W. R. Grace & Co. and 
the Neemix Patent (a);' 399- 409. 
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12. Perhaps the most famous of these involves a botanist named Jim who 
stumbles upon a village in the Amazon basin while looking for flow-
ers. "Jim finds himself in the central square of a small South American 
town. Tied up against the wall are a row of twenty Indians, most terri-
fied, a few defiant, in front of them several armed men in uniform. A 
heavy man in a sweat-stained khaki shirt turns out to be the captain in 
charge and, after a good deal of questioning of Jim which establishes 
that he got there by accident while on a botanical expedition, explains 
that the Indians are a random group of inhabitants who, after recent 
acts of protest against the government, are just about to be killed to 
remind other possible protestors of the advantage of not protest-
ing. However, since Jim is an honored visitor from another land, the 
captain is happy to offer him a guest's privilege of killing one of the 
Indians himself. If Jim accepts, then as a special mark of the occasion, 
the other Indians will be let off. Of course, ifJim refuses, then there is 
no special occasion, and Pedro here will do what he was about to do 
when Jim arrived, and kill them all. Jim, with some desperate recol-
lection of schoolboy fiction, wonders whether if he got hold of a gun, 
he could hold the captain, Pedro, and the rest of the soldiers to threat, 
but it is quite clear from the setup that nothing of that kind is going to 
work: any attempt at that sort of thing will mean that all the Indians 
will be killed, and himself. The men against the wall, and the other 
villagers understand the situation, and are obviously begging him to 
accept. What should he do?" Yikes! Cited in Pojman, Ethical Theory, 
191-92. See also Mulhall, "Mortality of the Soul;' 355- 79. 
13. Remember that mathematical "laws" are unattainable asymptotes for 
real machines. As such, math approximates reality and not the other 
way around. Math is at best a "rule of thumb" for real-world problems. 
More on this in chapter 3. 
14. We will later consider his more complete definition: "the engineering 
method is the use of heuristics to cause the best change in a poorly 
understood situation within the available resources:' Koen, Discus-
sion of the Method, 9, 28. 
15. Adapted from the diagram by Hill, Science of Engineering Design, 49. 
Notice that the book's title pairs engineering with "science" rather 
than the older understanding of engineering as an art form. Ars me-
chanicus will be explored in chapter 10. 
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16. Despite drawing the specious analogy between design and the sci-
entific method, Hill does note that, perhaps unlike science, design 
requires the iteration of some steps along the way. See ibid., 36-38. 
Similarly, Stuart Pugh acknowledges bidirectional feedback between 
stages of design. However, Pugh downplays this give and take on 
grounds that feedback diminishes as design progresses. See Pugh, 
Creating Innovative Products Using Total Design, 267- 68. 
17. Compiled from various diagrams used by Pugh over the course of his 
lifetime. See Pugh. 
18. However, even here we must be careful. Modelers cannot account for 
all the imperfections. Every computer model divvies up reality into 
chunks in order to make the calculations manageable. It is precisely 
here that engineers are in danger, when they forget to consider the 
modeler's assumptions. See Ferguson, "How Engineers Lose Touch:' 
19. White, "Eilmer of MalmesburY:' 
20. Seely, "Scientific Mystique;' 675- 702. 
21. For an account of math used rhetorically, see Seife, Proofiness. 
22. For example, the Boston Tunnel was originally designed to be tiled 
with metal-plated porcelain. Unfortunately, this expensive tile was 
substituted with cheaper, but much heavier, concrete ones. Fan1ously, 
five three-ton ceiling sections failed and crushed a car, killing a wom-
an on her way to the airport. Wald, "Late Design Change:' 
23. Amelie Rorty has written a clever satire showing how blindness sets in 
among team members. See her "How to Harden Your Heart:' 
24. Bucciarelli, Engineering Philosophy, 20. 
25. Ibid., 14. For a much more technical account of design discourse, see 
Bucciarelli, "Between Thought and Object;' 219- 31. 
26. " ... different forms of expressions go hand in hand with different ways 
of thinking about the world, about the existence of conceptual enti-
ties- their ontological status- and about the meaning and scope of 
the principles and requirements of the different paradigmatic sciences 
that frame thought and practice within object worlds. My framing of 
design as a social process in which different participants work within 
different object worlds which, in some restricted sense are incom-
mensurable worlds, leads me to claim they speak different languages:' 
Bucciarelli, Engineering Philosophy, 15. Whew! That's a mouthful. By 
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the way, why do professors write in such a complicated fashion? Might 
it be that sometimes profound or complex ideas can only be expressed 
in profound or complex ways? Could you explain differential equa-
tions to a ten-year-old? 
27. Bucciarelli writes about three firms he shadows and their three re-
spective design problems: a photovoltaic array for lighting highways 
in Saudi Arabia, a problem of dropout in quality for images of a high 
quantity photo-printer, and an X-ray machine for inspecting large 
cargo crates. Bucciarelli, Designing Engineers. 
28. Bucciarelli, Engineering Philosophy, 15. 
29. " . .. object world language is a proper language:' Ibid., 16. 
30. Ibid., 16- 21. 
31. In Bucciarelli's terms, "object worlds are incommensurable:' Ibid., 20. 
32. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §§99, 97, 256. 
33. This kind of trust toward others is one example of what Danish ethi-
cist Knud L0gstrup called "the sovereign expressions of life:' Or what 
John Howard Yoder called working "with the grain of the universe:' 
Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe; L0gstrup, Ethical Demand. 
34. "Different participants with different responsibilities, competencies 
and interests, speak different languages when working, for the most 
part alone, in their respective domains (electrical circuits, kinematics, 
linguistics, psychology, and so on). For this to ring true, we ought 
to construe language in the broadest terms- to include the sketch, 
the prototype, the charts, even a computer algorithm as elements em-
ployed in the productive exchange among participants. But individual 
effort within some disciplinary matrix does not suffice: Designing is a 
social process; it requires exchange and negotiation as well as intense 
work within object worlds." Bucciarelli, Engineering Philosophy, 21. 
Emphasis added. 
30 
